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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from the trial court's order dismissing the charges with prejudice 
following an order suppressing the evidence. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (West 2004) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
In an area known for drug trafficking, an officer observed defendant and another man 
make a hand-to-hand exchange consistent with a drug deal. When the officer approached, 
defendant walked away and the other man kicked something underneath a nearby Jeep. 
Did the officer have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, 
justifying a brief, investigatory detention? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying 
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 
94, f^ 11,100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially 
for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95,111, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 49. 
Preservation. The issue was preserved in the State's Memorandum in Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, see R. 67-56, and at the evidentiary hearing, R. 81. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone with 
intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) 
(West 2004). R. 5-4. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence. R. 55-49. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion and suppressed the evidence. 
R. 81-77 (Addendum); R. 97. The court thereafter certified that suppression of the evidence 
substantially impaired the State's ability to prosecute the case and dismissed the case with 
prejudice. R. 87-86. The State timely appealed. R. 89-88. The Supreme Court transferred 
the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (West 
2004). R. 91. 
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On the night of January 35 2004, Officer Robert Welcker was patrolling the streets of 
American Fork City in his marked police car. R. 97: 7-8 (R. 80: ^ 1). Just before midnight, 
he decided to drive through a trailer park that was "commonly known as a real problem area" 
for "drug dealing." R. 97: 8 (R. 80: <[ 3). The narcotics team had orchestrated "dozens" of 
controlled buys there. R. 97: 8. 
As he turned left to enter the trailer park, Officer Welcker observed two men conduct 
some kind of transaction in which they made a hand-to-hand exchange of something. R. 97: 
8, 12-13, 21-22 (R. 80: % 4). The two men were later identified as Stephen Lundy and 
defendant, Lowell Singleton. Defendant and Lundy were standing next to a Jeep that was 
parked, with its engine running and lights off, at the entrance of the trailer park. R. 97: 7-8, 
21 (R. 80:12). Two other people were sitting in the Jeep. R. 97: 17. Officer Welcker had 
made "numerous [drug-related] arrests" at that very entrance and had purchased controlled 
substances there as an undercover officer. R. 97: 9 (R. 80: ^ 3). After witnessing the 
exchange, Officer Welcker pulled up behind the Jeep and parked. R. 97:10-11,22 (R. 80: Tf 
4). He did not activate his red-and-blue overhead lights and did not block the Jeep's exit. R. 
97: 10-11 (R. 80: If 4). 
As soon as Officer Welcker stopped, defendant looked at the officer, then turned and 
walked toward the trailer park. R. 97: 11, 23 (R. 80: ^  5). Lundy, meanwhile, turned and 
walked to the passenger side of the Jeep. R. 97: 11, 23 (R. 80: % 5). When Officer Welcker 
exited his car and approached Lundy to ask Lundy if he could speak with him, Officer 
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Welcker "noticed that [Lundy] was kicking something underneath the Jeep" and "appeared 
to be kicking the snow." R. 97: 12 (R. 80: ^ f 6). Officer Welcker asked Lundy to approach 
him at the rear of the Jeep. R. 97: 13, 23 (R. 80: % 7). Officer Welcker then yelled to 
defendant, who was now at least one hundred feet away, "Sir, can you come back here, 
please?" R.97:13,23-24 (R. 80:17). Defendant returned. R.97:14-15. Back-up officers 
soon arrived and watched defendant while Officer Welcker spoke with Lundy. R. 97:16,27. 
Initially, Lundy told Officer Welcker that he had met defendant, whose last name he 
claimed he did not know, at the entrance of the trailer park because defendant did not like 
people coming to his trailer. R. 97:15-16,25-26,28-29. He said that he was there to talk to 
defendant about giving him a ride and they had just finished their conversation when the 
officer pulled up. R. 97: 16. When Officer Welcker asked Lundy what he was kicking, 
Lundy denied kicking anything. R. 97: 16. 
Officer Welcker checked underneath the Jeep and found a small baggy of crystal 
methamphetamine. R.97:16-17. Lundy immediately asserted that the two occupants in the 
Jeep did not know why he was there. R. 97: 17. Officer Welcker interrupted him to advise 
him of his rights. R. 97: 17. After waiving his rights, Lundy confirmed that the drugs were 
his and said that the occupants in the Jeep had nothing to do with the drugs. R. 97: 17. 
Lundy initially claimed that he was going to sell the drugs to defendant, but then told Officer 
Welcker that defendant had just sold the drugs to him. R. 97: 17, 26. Lundy said that he 
paid $70.00 in cash for the meth. R. 97: 18. He said that the money was "folded in fourths 
neatly" and consisted of "three 20's and a 10." R. 97: 18. 
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Defendant told Officer Welcker that he was there to talk with Lundy about a ride to 
Salt Lake City. R. 97: 19. But when asked why he was not leaving with Lundy, defendant 
had no explanation. R. 97:19. Meanwhile, a warrants check revealed that defendant had an 
outstanding warrant. R.97:19,26-28 (R. 80:^[ 10). He was then placed under arrest. R.97: 
19, 26-28 (R. 80: f 10). In a search incident to arrest, officers found cash in both of 
defendant's pockets. R. 97: 19. In one of the pockets, officers found $70.00 in cash as 
described by Lundy. R. 97: 19 (R. 80: ^  9). Officer Welcker showed Lundy the $70.00 and 
Lundy confirmed that it was the money he had given defendant for the drugs. R. 97: 19-20. 
When Officer Welcker confronted defendant with Lundy's statement that defendant sold the 
drugs to Lundy, defendant denied the claim and refused to speak with Officer Welcker 
further. R. 97: 20. 
Officer William Loveridge transported defendant and Lundy to the jail in his patrol 
car. R. 73; R. 97: 21 (R. 80: TflO). Eight days later, Officer Loveridge discovered fifteen 
baggies of methamphetamine under the back seat of the patrol car where defendant had been 
sitting when transported to the jail. R. 73 (R. 80: ^ f 12). No one else had sat in the car after 
defendant was transported to the jail and defendant was charged with possession of drugs 
with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone. R. 73 (R. 80: % 12). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's conclusion that Officer Welcker did not have reasonable suspicion to 
stop defendant was incorrect. Reasonable suspicion is a suspicion that arises from "specific 
and articulable facts" and the "rational inferences from those facts." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). "Although an officer's reliance on a mere '"hunch5" is 
insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level 
required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of 
the evidence standard." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 751 
(2002) (citations omitted). 
The facts confronting Officer Welcker satisfied the reasonable suspicion standard and 
were at least as indicative of misconduct as those in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,120 
S.Ct. 673 (2000), and State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, 47 P.3d 932, where reasonable 
suspicion was found. Defendant was present in an area known for drug trafficking. He was 
at the very location where Officer Welcker had purchased drugs as an undercover agent. He 
made a hand-to-hand exchange with another man in the cover of night that was consistent 
with a drug deal. Upon Officer Welcker's approach, defendant began walking away and the 
other man kicked something under a nearby vehicle. These facts, when considered together 
and in light of Officer Welcker's experience, were sufficient to form a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting that defendant was engaged in an illegal drug transaction. 
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ARGUMENT 
OFFICER WELCKER HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION SUPPORTED 
BY ARTICULABLE FACTS THAT DEFENDANT WAS ENGAGED IN AN 
UNLAWFUL DRUG TRANSACTION 
The trial court determined that Officer Welcker detained defendant when he yelled to 
him and asked that he come back. R. 79: f 1. The court ruled, however, that the detention 
was not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in a 
drug transaction. R. 79: If 2. The court thus concluded that the evidence discovered in the 
search of defendant incident to his ensuing arrest on a warrant was the product of the 
unlawful detention and inadmissible. R. 79-78: | | 3-4.l 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Officer Welcker did not have a reasonable 
suspicion that defendant and Lundy were engaged in a drug transaction. As a result, the 
search of defendant incident to his arrest on the warrant was lawful and the trial court erred 
in suppressing the evidence. 
* # * 
The law is well established that "the police can stop and briefly detain a person for 
investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts 
that criminal activity 'may be afoot' " United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7,109 S.Ct. 
1581, 1585 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884-85). Reasonable 
suspicion is "more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch."' Id. (quoting 
1
 The court also concluded that the State did not establish that the evidence would 
have inevitably been discovered. R. 79: f 5. 
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883). It is a suspicion that arises from "specific and 
articulable facts" and the "rational inferences from those facts." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 
S.Ct. at 1880. 
"The concept of reasonable suspicion... is not 'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules."' Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7,109 S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S 213,232,103 S.Ct. 2317,2332 (1983)). Instead, the Court "'look[s] to the totality 
of the circumstances . . . to determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal 
activity.'" State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, ^  8, 47 P.3d 932 (citation omitted). In doing 
so, the Court must judge the facts "'in light of common sense and ordinary human 
experience.'" Id. (citation omitted). The Court also '"accord[s] deference to an officer's 
ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.'" See Beach, 2002 UT App 
160, ^ 8. In other words, courts allow officers "to draw on their own experience and 
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative 
information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'" United States 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273,122 S.Ct. 744, 750-51 (2002) (citation omitted). In all cases, the 
Court must "avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from each 
other." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 14, 78 P.3d 590. 
"Although an officer's reliance on a mere 'hunch' is insufficient to justify a stop, the 
likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it 
falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." Arvizu, 534 
U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 751 (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, "[a] 
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determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of 
innocent conduct." Id. at 277,122 S.Ct. at 753. As observed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Sokolow, "innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of [reasonable 
suspicion].'" Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10,109 S.Ct. at 1587 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S at 243-44 
n. 13, 103 S.Ct. at 2335 n.13). The relevant inquiry "is not whether particular conduct is 
'innocent' or 'guilty,'" Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10, 109 S.Ct. at 1587, but whether "the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search 'warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate," Terry, 392 U.S. at 22,88 S.Ct. at 
1880 (citation omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
125, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 (2000), and this Court's decision in State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 
160,47 P.3d 932, demonstrate that the facts before Officer Welcker were sufficient to justify 
the investigatory stop. 
In Wardlow, a caravan of police officers drove through a neighborhood known for 
heavy narcotics trafficking. 528 U.S. at 121, 120 S.Ct. at 674. The last patrol unit saw 
defendant standing next to a building holding an opaque bag. Id. at 121-22,120 S.Ct. at 674-
75. When defendant saw the officers, he ran away. Id. at 122,120 S.Ct. at 675. The officers 
pursued defendant, stopped him, and frisked him, uncovering a .38 caliber handgun with five 
live rounds of ammunition. Id. 
The Court acknowledged that "[a]n individual's presence in an area of expected 
criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized 
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suspicion that the person is committing a crime." Id. at 124,120 S.Ct. at 676 (citing Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,99 S.Ct. 2637 (1979)). The Court pointed out, however, that presence 
in a high crime area is nevertheless "among the relevant contextual considerations" in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis. Id. at 124, 120 S.Ct. at 676. The Court explained that 
"officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining 
whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation." Id. 
The Court observed that defendant's presence in a high crime area was not the only 
factor supporting the officer's suspicion. The officer's suspicion was also aroused by 
defendant's "unprovoked flight upon noticing the police." Id. at 124,120 S.Ct. at 676. The 
Court "recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining 
reasonable suspicion" and that "[h]eadlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate 
act of evasion." Id. The Court explained that although unprovoked flight "is not necessarily 
indicative of wrongdoing, . . . it is certainly suggestive of such." Id. The Supreme Court 
concluded that defendant's presence in the high crime area, together with his unprovoked 
flight, was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Id. at 124-26, 120 S.Ct. at 676-77. 
In Beach, a narcotics officer and two other officers were patrolling a street in a 
neighborhood where there was a known drug house. 2002 UT App 160, f 2. The officer 
observed a car, bearing no visible license plates, parked partially in the traffic lane, facing 
the opposite direction. Id. As the officer drove by, he noticed the defendant, who was 
standing next to the car, pass something to one of the occupants in the car. Id. When the 
officer turned his vehicle around, the defendant quickly walked away in the opposite 
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direction. Id. The officer stopped defendant, and in the course of interviewing him, 
discovered that he was in possession of methamphetamine. Id. at |^ f 2-3. 
After noting that defendant was present in an area known for drug trafficking, 
conversing with occupants of a vehicle without plates, the Court held that the officer saw 
"specific behavior that reasonably led him to suspect that Defendant was distributing a 
controlled substance," to wit: the hand-to-hand exchange. Id. at If 9. The Court explained 
"that' although defendant's activity was conceivably consistent with innocent activity, it was 
strongly indicative of criminal activity,' and therefore the detention was reasonable." Id. atf 
10 (quoting Provo City v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah App. 1993)). 
* * * 
The circumstances confronting Officer Welcker in this case were at least as indicative 
of misconduct as those in Wardlow and Beach. The following facts informed Officer 
Welcker's decision to stop defendant: 
(1) Defendant and Stephen Lundy were standing next to a Jeep parked at the 
entrance of a trailer park, R. 80: ^  2; 
(2) the trailer park was known to be "a high crime area in which drug trafficking 
was common," R. 80: ^ j 3; 
(3) Officer Welcker had made "numerous arrests" at the entrance to the trailer 
park, R. 97: 8-9, and had "purchased drugs in [that] exact location previously, as an 
undercover police officer," R. 80: ^ | 3; 
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(4) Officer Welcker observed defendant and Lundy "conduct some kind [of] 
transaction in which they exchanged something hand to hand," R. 80: f 4; 
(5) the hand-to-hand exchange was consistent with a drug exchange, R. 97: 12; 
(6) it was midnight, R. 80:11; 
(7) the Jeep's engine was running but its headlights were off, R. 80: fflf 2, 4; 
(8) when Officer Welcker drove up and parked behind the Jeep, defendant walked 
away toward the trailer park and Lundy walked to the passenger side of the Jeep, R. 
80:^15; and 
(9) as Officer Welcker walked toward the Jeep, "Lundy kick[ed] something into 
the snow under the [Jeep],55 R. 80: ^ 6. 
As in Wardlow and Beach, defendant was in an area with a high incidence of drug 
trafficking. Moreover, he was in the exact location where numerous arrests had been made 
for drug dealing and where Officer Welcker had purchased drugs as an undercover narcotics 
officer. As in Beach, Officer Welcker "observed specific behavior that reasonably led him to 
suspect that Defendant was distributing [or purchasing] a controlled substance,55 to wit: the 
hand-to-hand exchange. See Beach, 2002 UT App 160,19. As in Wardlow m&Beach, both 
defendant and Lundy took evasive measures when they observed the police: the two parted, 
defendant walked away, and Lundy kicked something under the Jeep. And finally, the 
timing of the exchange at midnight and the fact that the Jeep's headlights were turned off, 
though its engine was running, was indicative of an effort to conceal the nature of their 
transaction. 
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Each of these facts, standing alone, is susceptible of an innocent explanation. 
However, when considered together and viewed in light of Officer Welcker's specialized 
training and experience as a narcotics officer, they sufficed to form a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting that the two men were engaged in an illegal drug transaction, 
as in Wardlow and Beach. The trial court, therefore, erred in suppressing the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial 
court's order and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted January 5, 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Y S. GRAY ~f 
distant Attorney General ^ 
Counsel for Appellant 
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UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LOWELL SINGLETON 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 041400234 
Judge ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
This matter came before the court for hearing on defendant's Motion to Suppress on June 
10,2004. The Defendant was present and represented by his counsel, Richard P. Gale. The State 
was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Donna Kelly. The court heard from Officer 
Robert Welcker of the American Fork Police Department and received by stipulation a type 
written proffer of Officer William Loveridge's testimony. Both parties submitted facts and law 
presented in their memoranda filed with the court. The Court having considered the Evidence, 
Motions, and Memoranda of the parties does hereby make and enter the following Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The court finds the facts are as follows: 
1. On January 3, 2004, Officer Robert Welcker of the American Fork Police Department 
was on patrol when he witnessed what he believed to be a suspicious circumstance. This /f\vJ^^^^ 
occurred at a late hour approximately 3Sk? ^ - ( B^< 0 0 IMA^CLVU^WlA « 
2. Welcker observed a vehicle parked with the engine running and the lights turned off at 
the entrance to a trailer park. 
3. Welcker knew this trailer park to be a high crime area in which drug trafficking was 
common. In fact, Welcker had purchased drugs in this exact location previouslyv (X S ®N\ 
4. Welcker observed two people conduct some kind a transaction in which they exchanged 
something hand to hand near the parked vehicle. Welcker pulled his patrol car behind the 
parked vehicle. He did not block the vehicle's exit. 
5. As Welcker approached the vehicle, one of the individuals, later identified as Stephen 
Lundy turned and walked to the passenger side of the vehicle. The second individual, later 
identified as the defendant, Lowell Singleton turned and walked towards the trailer court. 
6. Welcker got out of his patrol car and approached the vehicle. As he approached the 
vehicle he saw Lundy kick something into the snow under the car. 
7. Welcker asked Lundy to approach him at the rear of the vehicle and commanded 
Singleton in a stern voice to come back to the vehicle. 
8. Welcker detained Singleton while he talked with Lundy and investigated the matter. 
9. After obtaining a statement from Lundy, Welcker searched Singleton's person and wallet. 
In one of Singleton's pockets, Welcker found seventy dollars in cash. 
10. During his investigation Welcker located a warrant for Singleton's arrest. Singleton was 
arrested on the warrant and transported to jail by Officer Loveridge. 
11. Welcker' s detention of Singleton's person lasted approximately 15 minutes in its entirety. 
12. On January 11,8 days after Singleton was arrested and transported to the jail, Loveridge 
found 15 baggies containing a white powdery substance under the back seat of his patrol vehicle. 
This was the same back seat where Singleton had been sitting and nobody had been in the back 
of Loveridge's patrol vehicle since he had transported Singleton and Lundy to the jail.. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes that when Officer Welcker commanded Singleton to return to the 
vehicle he was detaining Singleton which constituted a level two encounter. The United States 
Supreme Court has declared that "a police officer may detain and question an individual 'when 
the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,450 (Utah 1996) (quoting United 
States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1983)). 
2. The court concludes that when Welcker stopped Singleton Welcker suspected that 
Singleton was involved in a drug transaction. However, the facts that Welcker relied upon for 
his belief are not sufficient to constitute reasonable articulable suspicion. 
3. The court concludes it was only after Singleton had already been illegally detained that 
Singleton was searched and a warrant for his arrest was located and Singleton was arrested. 
4. The court concludes that if Singleton had not been illegally detained he would not have 
been searched or arrested. Hence, any evidence found on his person and in the patrol car would 
not have been discovered. 
5. The court concludes that the inevitable discovery doctrine as set forth in Nix v. Williams, 
467 U.S. 431, 443-444 (1984) does not apply because the state did not establish by a 
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preponderance of the evidence that the evidence ultimately would have been discovered by 
lawful means. Had Singleton not been illegally detained Officer Welcher and allowed to leave 
the scene, Welcker would not have been able to verify Singleton's identity or locate the warrant 
for Singleton's arrest. 
ORDER 
Based on foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the court hereby Orders that 
any and all evidence discovered due to the illegal detention of the defendant including money 
found on his person and evidence found in the patrol car be suppressed as fruit of an illegal 
detention and search. 
Signed this 1 day of July, 2004. , \f W R zQ
 /A/ 
Approved as to form: J£f <^ - ^ ^ S ^ 
/Liu*,, m IfcfcM/ -sy 
Anthony W. Scjhofield ^ ^ ^ . - ^ J 
District Court Judge *%*%>*" .***<f? <v 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order to Donna Kelly, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606 
this Zl„ day of July, 2004 
